ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY POLICIES ADOPTED BY THE MILITARY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST BOKO-HARAM INSURGENCY IN NORTH-EASTERN NIGERIA
Date
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Abstract
The studies on Boko Haram insurgency have witnessed a number of contentious debates. Numbers of scholars and commentators have written a lot of thoughtful and dispassionate pieces about Boko Haram insurgency across most parts of the world. Yet, none from the researchers’ investigation has taken cognisance of the security policies adopted by the military in the fight against Boko-Haram insurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria. This gap identified in extant literature has greatly constituted a problematique that inform this study. The study examines security policies adopted by the military in the fight against Boko-Haram insurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria. Securitization theory was utilized as theoretical framework for the study. Information was sourced through the use of interview. Data from extant literatures was equally used. The study observed that there are no purely military solutions to pulling a nation or region out of the death spiral of violent extremism. There is a need to abandon the conventional military-centric approach as the one and only option for insurgency and other asymmetric conflicts. While not ignoring the importance of using military force, stability, political-economic-social development, rule of law, popular well-being, and sustainable peace all depend on effective and legitimate control of the national territory. Thus, a military-centric approach must be balanced with a population-centric approach for maximum effect and legitimacy. Therefore, the study strongly recommends that counterinsurgency should not be seen as a blunt military effort that focuses solely on capturing and killing high value targets. An important part of counterinsurgency in Nigeria demands a greater reliance on non-military force. Exercise of military power should be used to create the space for political progress, Whiletackling armed insurgents, increasing efforts should also be channeled to economic, social and infrastructural development in the affected areas, in the bid to win the hearts and minds of the local people.