

Perception Survey on Southern Kaduna Crises: Causes, management and way forward

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Abstract:

The Southern Kaduna crisis has threatened the fabrics of Nigeria and is disintegrating the country. The crises has taken a new dimension and perpetrators has continued to improve on the methods of attacking their targets, thus constituting a major threat to the management of national security and economic development in the state. As such, this paper analyses the causes and management of the southern Kaduna crises and suggest way forward. The method adopted is essentially the content analysis and survey method. This study shows that the causes responsible for the crises in Southern Kaduna are but not limited to the popular ethno-religious, politically, grazing/farming, economic, indigene/settler dichotomy, organized violent groups, perceptions between the public and government, fear of domination, pervasive material inequalities and unfairness among others and the nature of the suffering and misery of the southern Kaduna victim of the crises could be seen from the wanton destruction of lives and properties, slowing down of economic activities, fear of herdsmen attack on their farm, high rate of orphans and widows, as well as making many homeless thereby staying in internally displace camp (IDP) as their new home. Thus, it is recommended that the Kaduna State Government should endeavour to look into the root causes of these crises objectively as soon as possible since political, ethno-religious as well as personal agenda has been the major causes of the crisis. Also to ensure that dialogue is effectively used as a way of settling disputes rather than resorting to violence and since the resultant effects of this crisis has causes wanton destruction of lives, properties, and many more. Government should make adequate prevention and effective emergency response focusing on the rising state of insecurity in the southern Kaduna.

Key Words: Crises, Causes, Southern Kaduna, Ethno-Religious conflict, Insecurity and Politically Based Violence

Introduction

Kaduna State is currently enmeshed in a humanitarian crises. The southern part of the state has become the epicentre of deadly violence; most of it inflicted by herdsmen on farming communities, organized religious sects, political, and organized violent groups among others.

Thus, most societies struggle with its own peculiar social problems, just like any other society of the world. One of these problems in Nigeria is the crises in southern Kaduna. Conflict is prone to take place under any atmosphere, as far as it is a conglomeration of living things. The Nigerian society which was built on a platform of a merging together of different regions, religions, and ethnic groups, has been besieged with hatred (verbal and physical) which culminates into conflicts. In the observation of Paden (2015), these conflict situation emanates due to the evenly divided Nigerian population of just over 180 million, between Muslims and Christians.

Crises in southern Kaduna came to limelight with the Zango Kataf crisis of May 1992. In May 1992, in what became known as the Zangon-Kataf crisis, there were clashes in Zangon-Kataf between the Hausa and the Kataf (a predominantly Christian ethnic group), initially sparked off by a dispute over the relocation of a market (Akin et al 1999). The Hausa opposed the relocation of the market to the new spacious area, preferring it remained in the cramped town of Zango Kataf -(Lukat, 2016). Riots erupted with the burning of churches and mosques, hospitals and educational centres. This conflict divided Kaduna state along religious, political, and ethnic lines. There became distrust in the state amongst various religious adherents. These crises have continued to reoccur and hundreds of lives have been lost and are still being lost to the southern Kaduna crises. The state and the federal government have made several interventions, but none has yielded the needed effects. It is in this light that this article focuses on the perception survey on southern Kaduna crisis: causes and way

Statement of the Problem

In the world today, the strategic nature of crisis is constantly evolving taking one form or the other. From the ethno-religious conflict, politically based violence, economic-based violence and organized violent groups, the security situation in southern Kaduna has become enormous and embarrassing to government and the society. Currently, the issue of southern Kaduna crises cannot be over-looked, particularly as it has become one of the greatest threats to government in state and Nigeria at large.

These crises has threatens the fabrics of Nigeria and is disintegrating the country. It is pertinent to state that the crises has taken a new dimension perpetrators continued to improve on the methods of attacking their targets. It has advanced from the stages of assassination, gunpowder plot to that of local bomb-planting explosive attacks, sporadic shooting in rural areas, especially religious places and more recently kidnapping that has destabilised the state. More so, southern Kaduna crises poses enormous and complex threat to the management of national security in Nigeria, which is a major challenge to human security and economic development. Southern Kaduna crises is undoubtedly one of the problems in Nigeria a catalytic agent in the worsening

of one Nigeria's main problem; national unity. From this viewpoint, it can be seen that southern Kaduna crises is a serious challenge to security in the state. As such, this paper is designed to access, scrutinize causes and sources of the southern Kaduna crises which affect the coexistence of the Kaduna State at large.

Specifically, the objectives of this paper area to;

- i. Investigate the causes of southern Kaduna crises.
- ii. Draw attention to the suffering and misery of the southern Kaduna of the crises.
- iii. Examine the action and inaction of government towards the southern Kaduna crises.
- iv. Find out the challenges associated with cubing the southern Kaduna crises and the way forward.

Conceptual Framework

Concept of Southern Kaduna

According to Gudaku, (2017), the use of the term "Southern Kaduna" is not simply geographical but carries with it a range of undertones concerning social identity, religious affiliation and cultural heritage. For some it refers to the southern part of Kaduna State (which officially came into being in 1987, when it was detached from Katsina Province) it contains a potpourri of over 30 ethnic nationalities, including: Atyap, Attachirak, Tsam, Kagoma, Fantswam, Adara, Akurmi, Ninkyop, Agbiri, Amap, Asholio and others, all of whom are predominantly Christian. But others stressed that the use of the term "Southern Kaduna" goes back to the beginning of the 20th century and British colonial administration, where it encapsulates the struggle against Muslim Hausa-Fulani hegemony by Christian ethnic nationalities (Gudaku, 2017). It is little wonder that many therefore understand "Southern Kaduna" as a cultural area and home to a Christian religious groups, which due to its marginal status is also regarded as a second-class community.

Use of the term has become a form of protest against Muslim domination. The indigenous people of Southern Kaduna feel an alien system of governance has always been imposed upon them, including slavery. In 1450-1850 it was the Saurata system in Zazzau, then came the Emirate System in 1816-1903 and the Native Authority System in 1903-1930, and in all these periods the indigenous people were marginalized and their land exploited (Gudaku , 2017). Even though the Hausa-Fulani Muslims were a minority in Southern Kaduna, their neighborhoods and local communities became the focal point of all economic, political and administrative life (ibid).

Concept of ethno-religious conflict

According to Jega, (2002), ethno-religious conflict is a situation in which the relationship between members of one ethnic group and another, or generally amongst ethnic groups in a multicultural polity such as Nigeria is characterized by a lack of cordiality, by heightened mutual suspicions and fears, by quarrelsomeness and by a tendency towards violent confrontations. Conflict from an ethno-religious perspective erupts when varying groups feel threatened by the activities of other groups which could as a result of a minor disagreement between their respective members over non-trivial issues lead to the manifestation of tensions in the society. It has been posited that "there

are two major types of sources of this category of tension in Nigeria, namely that associated with the character of the relationship between the so-called "settlers" and their "host" community; and that associated with perceptions of how kinsmen are being treated in distant locations, which attracts reprisal attacks or sentiment". This scenario is so common in the northern part of the country with Kaduna State among the most prominent places of occurrence.

Concept of religious conflict

Religious conflict results when a group of people with a belief or dogma finds it difficult to accommodate the belief and dogma of another group of people. This often results in physical and vocal assaults or cold war. Religious conflicts are a more complex phenomenon that engages a combination of contested domains, including power, personality, space or place, and group identity (Wendy, 2017). This portends that when two religious groups struggle for supremacy in power or to show their affinity in terms of their religious beliefs, religious conflicts occur. Religious conflict is a struggle between and among individuals or groups over values and claims to scarce resources, status symbols, and power bases. The objective of the individuals or groups during conflict is to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals so that they can enjoy the scarce resources, the status symbols, and power bases (Okai, 2017).

In Nigeria, especially in northern Nigeria, religious conflicts was firmly rooted as a response to the colonial pattern of government employed and actualized by the Lord Lugard and his men. Gofwen, (2004) notes: —To convince the Northern emirs and the sultan of the commitment of the colonial government towards maintaining the socio-political status quo, it became a matter of colonial policy not to interfere with the functioning of the existing institutions, rather, they were strengthened on the condition that they were accountable and made subservient to the colonial government. Nwaomah, (2011) opines that in these circumstances, and depending on the degree of threat that the colonial government thought each religion posed to the colonial system in a locality, the colonial authorities evolved administrative patterns that served their purpose of strengthening the colonial system. However, it seems, by its policies, that the colonial system developed a system of non-interference on Islamic affairs and seemed to have inadvertently limited the spread of Christianity in Northern Nigeria. Certain policies seemed to point in this direction.

The concept of insecurity

The concept of insecurity would be best understood by first presenting the concept of security. In the view of Akin (2008) security refers to "the situation that exists as a result of the establishment of measures for the protection of persons, information and property against hostile persons, influences and actions". It is the existence of conditions within which people in a society can go about their normal daily activities without any threats to their lives or properties. It embraces all measures designed to protect and safeguard the citizenry and the resources of individuals, groups, businesses and the nation against sabotage or violent occurrence (Ogunleye, et al, 2011). According to Igbuzor (2011) it demands safety from chronic threats and protection from harmful disruption.

Security however, can be described as stability and continuity of livelihood (stable and steady income), predictability of daily life (knowing what to expect),

protection from crime (feeling safe), and freedom from psychological harm (safety or protection from emotional stress which results from the assurance or knowing that one is wanted, accepted, loved and protected in one's community or neighbourhood and by people around. It focuses on emotional and psychological sense of belonging to a social group which can offer one protection). This description structured the concept of security into four dimensions. However, these dimension can be weaved together to give a composite definition of security as the protection against all forms of harm whether physical, economic or psychological. It is generally argued however that security is not the absence of threats or security issues, but the ability to rise to the challenges posed by these threats with expediency and expertise.

Insecurity on the other hand, is the antithesis of security. However, because of the very many ways in which insecurity affects human life and existence, the concept of insecurity has usually been ascribed different interpretations in association with the various ways which it affects individuals. Some of the common descriptors of insecurity include: want of safety; danger; hazard; uncertainty; want of confidence; doubtful; inadequately guarded or protected; lacking stability; troubled; lack of protection; and unsafe, to mention a few. All of these have been used by different people to define the concept of insecurity. These different descriptors, however, run into a common reference to a state of vulnerability to harm and loss of life, property or livelihood. Beland (2005) defined insecurity as "the state of fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection." It refers to lack or inadequate freedom from danger. This definition reflects physical insecurity which is the most visible form of insecurity, and it feeds into many other forms of insecurity such as economic security and social security.

Concept of terrorism

At the most proximate and least disputable level, terrorism is the most fundamental source of insecurity in Nigeria today, and its primary bases and sources of support have generally been located in religious fanaticism and intolerance particularly in Islam dominated states of Nigeria. Terrorism which is a global phenomenon where no one is safe was defined by Sampson and Onuoha (2011) as "the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by an individual or group to cause fear, destruction or death, especially against unarmed targets, property or infrastructure in a state, intended to compel those in authority to respond to the demands and expectations of the individual or group behind such violent acts".

Historical antecedent of Southern Kaduna Crises

Kauru, Kachia, Zango-Kataf, Kaura, Kagarko, Jaba, Jema'a, Sanga, are the local government areas that constitute southern Kaduna. It was known as southern Zaria before Nigeria got her independence from Britain in 1960. Most crises in southern Kaduna starts with land disputes before it degenerates into a full-blown religious war. 1987 burning down of College of Education Kafanchan signalled the hatred between the Christians and Muslims in Kaduna. Zwahu Bonnat puts that Muslim Students Society attacked students of the College of Education hence the escalation of the crisis along religious lines. Ajunwa Patrick reports that the crisis at the college of education "spread to other parts of the state leading to the burning of places of worship,

with many lives and properties worth millions of naira lost. Consequently, in 1992, the Zango Kataf Crisis catalysed the hike in killings in southern Kaduna. The Zangon Katab has the Atyap as the dominant ethnic group. The Zango Kataf crisis was bloody on February 6th and May 15th and 16th 1992. (Favour, 2018).

Furthermore, in 1999, there was an ethno-religious assault and aggression against Southern Kaduna Christians. Edwards Johns reveals that residents of Jama'a emirate took the opportunity of the appointment of a new Emir of Jama'a to protest not only this appointment but the entire emirate system but unknown to them the protest turned into rioting between the Hausa minority and the non-Hausa majority resulting in the deaths of perhaps 30 persons and the injury of several others. Also, Zwahu Bonnat explains that Southern Kaduna people were killed, beaten, matcheted, and Human Right Watch describes it as the single worst outbreak of violence in Nigeria since the 1967-70 civil war. Consequently, according to the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Kaduna State Religious Disturbances of February 2000, (Favour, 2018).

The 2000 violence in Kaduna took place in two main waves—sometimes referred to as “Sharia 1” and “Sharia 2” — a first wave from February 21 to 25, with further killings in March, followed by a second wave from May 22 to 23. In reaction to the prospect of the introduction of Sharia into Kaduna Sate (sic), the Kaduna branch of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) organized a public protest on February 21. Then the situation degenerated: Muslim youths clashed with the Christian protestors, and fighting between Christians and Muslims spiraled (sic) out of control, with massive violence and destruction on both sides. An accurate, total death toll has never been ascertained, and as is typical in these situations, government and police officials were keen to play down the figures. A judicial commission of inquiry set up by the Kaduna state government reported that at least 1,295 people had been killed, while an unspecified additional number were buried unidentified, and others were declared missing (Favour, 2018).

Also, in 2002, in Birnin Gwari, a woman was killed, and they alleged that the killer was wearing a fez cap; one Kataf man who had been away at Zaria when the incident occurred, returned to Birnin Gwari and was killed, several other “Katafs” i.e Southern Kaduna people were killed, their houses and property burnt (Zwahu Bonnat). This 2002 crisis according to international observers like the human right watch erupted because the factors that led to the 2000 crisis were not addressed.

On September 2, 2011 Zwahu Bonnat explains that, a Sallah procession was allowed to take place under heavy police and military guard, and the celebrants-in-procession carried and waved different weapons, including machetes, knives, swords, cutlasses and other dangerous instruments of war and they drove their motorcycles wildly, knocked down and killed two Arna women. The youths put up strategies to defend their community but late in the evening of that day, the army JTF launched attacks on houses at Adauwan breaking down doors, dragging out youths, hammered them with gun butts, beat and brutalized them.

Very important to state, is the 2016 southern Kaduna massacre which some nongovernmental organizations have titled genocide against southern Kaduna indigenes. Uche Atuma narrates that The Catholic Archdiocese of Kafanchan has said the unrest in Southern Kaduna State has claimed 808 lives. Fifty three villages have so

far been attacked and 57 people injured, the church said. However, the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association, the umbrella organization of herdsmen notes that the group said it has lost no fewer than 6,000 cows to the crisis in Southern Kaduna. The group faulted claims by independent bodies that the indigenes of southern Kaduna were the sole victims of the *conflict going on there* (Favour, 2018).

Causes of the Southern Kaduna Crises

The causes of the crises in southern Kaduna cannot be underestimated. One of the causes is the fight for supremacy over land. Luka Binniyat discovers from Musa Kaptain Solomon, president of Southern Kaduna Peoples Union, that the quest for Southern Kaduna land, through the creation of grazing reserves is the cause of the Southern Kaduna crises. It could be deciphered that southern Kaduna has agriculture as the main stay of her economy, hence, the vegetative nature of her ecosystem. The herdsmen having no green vegetation to use to feed their cattle resorted to taking their cattle into the farm lands of the indigenes of southern Kaduna.

Consequently, the herdsmen are armed in such a way that any resistance from the indigenes would result to a fire from the nozzle of a gun and the edge of a cutlass. Furthermore, Luka Binniyat explains that the first is expropriating lands belonging to indigenes of southern Kaduna and giving it to the Fulani. The second is that if they resist, they would be killed and chased out.

The third is the perception that southern Kaduna shall be kept under perpetual intimidation until they run away from their lands on their own.

Foreigners from mostly Niger, Mali and Chad have constituted themselves as tools to be used in the destruction of lands and properties in southern Kaduna. This is evident in the speech by the governor of Kaduna state, Mallam Nasiru Rufai that the attackers were from Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Mali and Senegal and that the attack in southern Kaduna was a reprisal attack to what southern Kaduna indigenes did to them after the 2011 elections. Sola Ojo reveals that the governor further noted how he went and pleaded for a stoppage to the incessant riots in southern Kaduna the herdsmen asked for monetary compensation and he as the governor paid them. For this statement, the governor has been able to prove that the perpetrators of these crises in southern Kaduna are mercenaries from neighbouring countries (Favour, 2018).

Hate Speeches, claims and counter claims are other contributory factors to the survival of religious conflicts in southern Kaduna. The exchange of war provoking statements from both the leaders of the Christian Association of Nigeria and the Islam leaders have fuelled the reoccurrence of the war and cold war in southern Kaduna. For the Islam leaders, Luka Binniyat puts that, they said that the issue of grazing reserves is not related to this problem, because the grazing reserves have been there back to colonial days hence the right of the Fulani's to own the land, that's why the herdsmen should not be held accountable for what they do. Also, the Minister of Interior, Abdulrahman Dambazau, said: "...there are people who are always looking for ways to further create division along religious or ethnic fault lines for their selfish interest, with the aim of creating instability in our internal security... True religious leaders do not fan the embers of hate, but ensure that communities live in peace and harmony". Dambazau

was referring to leaders of the CAN and the Roman Catholic Church. The Kaduna state Christian Association of Nigeria replied him, "Shut up if you have nothing to say"... it would be an unfortunate thing for a Minister like Dambazau to say that the Christian leadership in the country was fanning the embers of hatred." This exchange of vocal war words has served to fuel the disputes between indigenes and non-indigenes in southern Kaduna which have degenerated into a religious conflict.

The hypocrisy of security agencies has not helped matters, in the worsening situations in southern Kaduna. According to the report of the International Centre for Investigative Justice, the killings in Southern Kaduna continued relentlessly, as the state and security agencies appear helpless in tackling the crisis and ICIJ reveals that Southern Kaduna has been attacked about 41 times between 2009 and May 1, 2016, with hundreds of deaths and thousands of property destroyed. The security agencies of Nigeria is made up of the Nigerian army, Nigerian police, and State Security Service, amongst others. Lamenting further, Luka Binniyat notes that the community members in some of the affected southern local government areas said that, "there is a large presence of police in Goska now. But as far as we are concerned, it means nothing to us. They have burnt the whole town and destroyed our possession. This morning...11 persons killed, about 15 injured." (Favour, 2018).

Manifestations of Crises in the State

The underlisted are the various manifestations of crises and insecurity in the state:

Ethno-religious conflict

Communal and societal conflicts according to Ibrahim and Igbuzor (2002) have emerged as a result of new and particularistic forms of political consciousness and identity often structured around ethno-religious identities. In all parts of Nigeria, ethno-religious conflicts have assumed alarming rates.

It has occurred in places like Southern Kaduna, Shagamu (Ogun State), Lagos, Abia, Kano, Bauchi, Nassarawa, Jos, Taraba, Ebonyi and Enugu State respectively. Groups and communities who had over the years lived together in peace and harmony now take up arms against each other in gruesome "war". The claim over scarce resources, power, land, chieftaincy, local government, councils, control of markets, "Osu caste system" and sharia among other issues have resulted in large scale killings and violence amongst groups in Nigeria. In these conflicts, new logics of social separation and dichotomy have evolved in many communities in Nigeria. There is the classification of the "settler" and "indigene", "Christian" and "Moslem", and "osu" (slave) and "Nwadiala" (free born). These ethno-religious identities have become disintegrative and destructive social elements threatening the peace, stability and security in Nigeria.

Politically based violence

Politics in the current civil dispensation like the previous Republics have displayed politics of anxiety which has played down on dialogue, negotiation and consensus. The anxiety is as a result of perceived or real loss of power by an elite stratum. Put different the quest for political power is among those elites that won it before, those that lost it and those who want it back.

Currently, politicians are always strategizing about the control and retention of power during elections. To this end, inter and intra-political party conflicts have

become rife in which politicians are deploying large resources to out-do each other, changing the rules and legislations of the political game, distorting laws and employing violence and political assassination to settle political scores.

Party meeting, campaigns and conventions have become war threats where small and light weapons like guns, and cutlasses are freely displayed and used to rig elections, harass and intimidate electors.

Also, a spate of politically motivated killing is rife. The most shocking of this killing was the murder of Chief Bola Ige, Funsho Williams, and Ogbonna Uche, among others Onyemaizu (2006:10) adds:

A resort to violence, including armed militancy, assassination, kidnap, et cetera, have somewhat suddenly become attractive to certain individuals in seeking to resolve issues that could have ordinarily been settled through due process. The end-products of such misadventures have often been catastrophic. They include the decimation of innocent lives, disruption of economic activities, destruction of properties among others.

The predilection of most of the politicians is not for election but selection. This lack of party internal democracy is already being revealed in the party primaries, and "selection" of national executive officers of the parties.

Economic-violence

In a popular parlance, this thesis is also known as "political economy of violence". Recent writings in the mass media across the globe and across political divide have laid much emphasis on the role of resources in generating conflict which is a major cornerstone of economic-based violence. Cries of resource control and revenue sharing regularly rent the air between proponents and opponents.

Although by no means limited to oil in the Niger Delta, the most prevalent campaign about the link between resources and conflict focuses on oil and the Delta region. Given the pivotal role that oil plays in the restructuring power relations in Nigeria there is evidence to suggest that oil has given rise to vertical and horizontal conflicts between national, state and society or between dominant and subordinate geo-political zones, classes and groups across Nigeria.

It is however true that other types of resource driven conflicts have received less attention in the debate. Assets such as grazing and farming and water resource, have tended to give rise to horizontal conflicts that involve communities across the geo-political zones.

The other thesis is that conflict in Nigeria is poverty induced. This explanation is closely related to relative deprivation, rather than absolute poverty. As a result of the above, the inability of the state to provide basic services for the populace, generate new conflict or renew old ones manifested through politicized agents who have used the conditions of the poor to address, the responses or non responses of the state to the legitimate yearnings of the people.

Organized violent groups

Organized violent groups take varying dimension and forms. These include: ethnic militias, vigilantes, secret cults in tertiary institutions and political thugs. Various reasons and circumstances account for their emergence. The causes of this

violence has its antecedents in military rule, the failure of the state and its institutions, economic disempowerment, the structure of the state and Nigeria's federalism, non-separation of state and religion, politics of exclusion, culture of patriarchy and gerontocracy and ignorance and poor political consciousness which has resulted to organized violence by members of the society (Ibrahim and Igbuzor, 2002:7).

Conflict of perceptions between the public and government

Over the years, there has been a standing mismatch between public and government perceptions. A situation which often result in the reactions of the public to the excesses of the military regimes which governed Nigeria and has continued after the end of military regimes and created a sensitivity by those in government at public intrusion in matters of state. Frequently, on any given incident, public and government reactions diverge. In such situations, the media has never helped matters. Media practices have always focused on the dramatic and the spectacular view of the given situations. Such reports have always been capitalized on in sophisticated ways by various groups, some of which are violent to incite public clamour for a change and immediate reaction through strategically provocative violence. The point here is that the approach of media report over the years has contributed to exacerbate insecurity or perception of insecurity in Nigeria. President Jonathan alluded to this situation when he made reference to the popular axiom that the pen is mightier than the sword (Bello and Oyedele, 2012). In his statement, "the sword is used to kill and destroy but what we use the pen to do is also very critical. When you have a society with these unending political conflicts, it is there on the media whether print, electronic or social media and this brings a lot of insecurity to the system" (Bello and Oyedele, 2012).

Crisis due to pervasive material inequalities and unfairness

Greater awareness of disparities in life chances is a major root cause of insecurity in Nigeria. This is a rooted general perception of inequality and unfairness which has resulted in grievance by a large number of people.

This perception stems from the perception of marginalization by a section of the people, government development policies and political offices and this has become a primary source of disaffection and resentment.

As noted by Onuoha (2011) a large number of the Nigeria population is frustrated and have lost hope, especially the youths, and have now emerged to express their disillusion about the pervasive state of inequality.

Methodology

The method adopted for this study is essentially the survey and content analysis. The population of the study comprise of the 8 local government areas that constitute Southern Kaduna. The technique used in drawing the sample size is Taro Yamane (1967): The sample size of 400 was selected using Stratified Random Sampling Techniques to effectively carry out the study, which is made up of 55 individuals from Jama'a local government area, 30 respondents from Kachia local government area, 68 respondents from Kaura, 40 respondents from Kagarko local government area, 42 respondents from Kauru, 30 respondents from Jaba local government, 47 respondents from Sanga and the remaining 78 were from Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area.

Both primary and secondary sources of data collection were utilized for the study. The primary data for the study was collected through the administration of self-constructed questionnaire which were administered to the respondents in the selected communities mentioned. The secondary data was collected through the review of previous studies, books, journals and existing literature on the subject matter.

Data Presentation and Analysis

In order to accomplish the objectives of this paper, relevant questions that capture the research objectives were asked in the questionnaire to gather information from the respondents of the Southern Kaduna. The questionnaire was meticulously filled and returned. The results of the data collected, there from are presented as follows:

Study question 1: Factors responsible for the Crisis in Southern Kaduna

Table 1

Responses	No of respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	326	87.2
No	10	2.7
Undecided	38	10.1
Total	374	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

Study question 2: Causes of Southern Kaduna Crisis

Table 2

Responses	No of respondents	Percentage (%)
Ethno-religious Reasons	47	12.5
Politically Based Reasons	39	10.4
Farmers/Headers Based Reasons	41	10.9
Economic-Based Reasons	22	5.9
The division between native residents and the new-comers	43	11.5
Organized Violent Groups	33	8.8
Conflict of Perceptions between the public and –government	30	8
The fear of domination	43	11.5
Crisis due to pervasive material inequalities and unfairness	26	6.9
All reasons stated above	50	13.3
Total	374	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

Study question 3: The nature of the suffering and misery of the Southern Kaduna victim of the crisis

Table 3

Responses	No of respondents	Percentage (%)
Loss of lives	54	14.4
Loss of properties	47	12.5
Slow economic activities	41	10.9
Fair of herdsmen attack on their farm	48	12.8
Made many orphans and widows	63	16.8
Renders many homeless	51	13.6
All the reasons stated above	70	18.7
Total	374	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

Study question 4: The action of government towards the Southern Kaduna crisis.

Table 4

Response	No of respondent	Percentage
Through arrest, prosecute and make perpetrators accountable for their crimes	77	20.5
Through the deployment of a special security task force to the affected area	84	22.5
By setting up an Ad-hoc Committee on Peace and Reconciliation to deal with the crisis	93	24.9
Not sure of any action by the government	120	32.1
Total	374	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

Study question 5: The challenges associated with cubing the Southern Kaduna crisis.

Table 5

Response	No of respondent	Percentage (%)
Government inadequacies of security management in the crisis area	52	13.9
Political instigation	45	12
Religious belief and domination	54	14.4
None recognition of the traditional institutions in the area	50	13.4
Nepotism and personal interest among security personnel	32	8.5
Inequality of facilities distribution in the state	53	14.1
All reasons stated above	88	23.5
Total	374	100

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

Findings and Discussion

It is quite clear from the analysis of the data presented above that there are factors responsible for the crises in Southern Kaduna and this causes are but not limited to ethno-religious reasons, politically based reasons, Farmers/herders based reasons, economic based reasons, the division between native residents and the new-comers also causes crisis in southern Kaduna, organized violent groups, conflict of perceptions between the public and –government, fear of domination, pervasive material inequalities and unfairness all are belief to be the root causes of Southern Kaduna crises. From the table 3 above, when the respondents were asked on the nature of the suffering and misery of the southern Kaduna victim of the crisis they all agreed that loss of lives of their loved ones, loss of properties, slow economic activities, fear of herdsman attack on their farm, which the resultant effect has rendered many to become orphans and widows, also it has resulted in making many homeless and to stay in internally displace camp (IDP) as their new homes.

From the table 4 above, it shows the action of government towards the southern Kaduna crises which could be seen through arrest, prosecute and make perpetrators accountable for their crimes, through the deployment of a special security task force to the affected area, by setting up an Ad-hoc Committee on Peace and Reconciliation to deal with the crisis, which majority of the respondents agree that all the above have been a proper gander but not in reality as it was as far as the crises is concern.

Table 5: Revealed that, there exists inadequacy of security management in the crisis area, political instigation, religious belief and domination, none recognition of the traditional institutions in the area, nepotism and personal interest among security personnel and inequality of facilities distribution in the state has been the major challenges associated with cubing the southern Kaduna crisis.

Conclusion

It is safe to conclude that the causes of the crises in southern Kaduna cannot be underestimated as the study has clearly outlined the different factors and categories of the southern Kaduna crises which range from the popular ethno-religious, politically, grazing/farming, economic, the division between native and new-comers, organized violent groups, perceptions between the public and government, fear of domination, pervasive material inequalities and unfairness among others. It is therefore deemed reasonable to conclude that there is a political, ethno-religious as well as personal agenda to create tension among the native resident in the various communities of Southern Kaduna.

The nature of the crises cannot be overemphasized as it could be seen from the wanton destruction of lives and properties, slowing down of economic activities, fear of herdsmen attack on their farm, high rate of orphans and widows, as well as making many homeless thereby staying in internally displace camp (IDP) as their new home. Many deaths were recorded which has led to the downsizing of the population. Most elderly persons, as well as children, were killed. Hence, the ideas which the young ones would have gotten from the older once have been wiped cut short, hence, there is bound to be knowledge drain, especially with the deaths of teachers and tutors. Many of the displaced persons have been forced to live in the Kafanchan IDP camp or with relatives and families in Kafanchan, Kagoro or Kaduna and are in need of aid. Humanitarian support for the Kafanchan IDP camp aid is not supplied by the government and it has to rely on NGOs, humanitarian services and churches to provide some assistance in the form of clothing and food.

The government has failed in its capacity to arrest, prosecute and make perpetrators accountable for their crimes. Instead, those responsible for attacks in Southern Kaduna have been allowed to behave with impunity. Despite the deployment of a special security task force to the affected area to restore peace, attacks and silent killings have continued to occur making the communities to be more worried as even with the Ad-hoc Committee on Peace and Reconciliation to deal with the crisis in Southern Kaduna is just a propagander and not in reality as it was, as far as, the crises is concern as some of the committees are simply set up to reward political associates as most hardly visit the scene of this crisis to see for themselves victims and survivors but simply repeat previous recommendations and receive their attendance allowances. Finally, the inadequacy of security management in the crises area, political instigation, nepotism and personal interest among security personnel has been compromised as officers who happen to be indigenes of the place take sides thus, aiding the attackers in committing more atrocities.

Recommendations

On the basis of the findings of the study, the following recommendations are put forward, with the hope that if implemented religiously it would make the Southern Kaduna which is known to be a crises zone a model in Nigeria.

The Kaduna State Government should endeavour to look into the root causes of these crises objectively as soon as possible since political, ethno-religious as well as personal agenda has been the major causes of the crisis in the state and to ensure that dialogue is effectively used as a way of settling disputes rather than resorting to violence.

- ii. Since the resultant effects of these crises has causes wanton destruction of lives, properties, and many more, the government should make adequate prevention and fast emergency response focusing on the rising state of insecurity in the southern Kaduna.
- iii. The government should make sure that all those involved in any act of political, ethno-religious as well as personal agenda towards causing the Southern Kaduna crises should be made to bear the full weight of the law.
- iv. The current feature of the Southern Kaduna crises is the failure of the government to provide adequate security management in the crises area, as political instigation, religious belief and domination and none recognition of the traditional institutions in the area keep increasing making nepotism and personal interest among security personnel and to influence policy formulation. Thus, the government should encourage inter-community engagement and dialogue as a necessary process to attaining peace and stability and to discourage any form of biased among security personnel in the area.

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