

## AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT PROJECT AND THE POLITICAL ANTIGEN

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### Abstract

*That Africa's effort at achieving development has yielded very meagre result is not surprising; the truth is that pre- and post-independence development effort has been largely challenged by a myriad of problems, chief of which is elite power politics. By its character, the African state has remained statist, with the major, and indeed only preoccupation of the colonialist and the post-independence nationalist-cum-elite being power ascription. In the deep immersion in power pursuit, development was hardly or scarcely in the agenda of the African state, irrespective of the era: colonial or post-independence. This study contends that although much has been said in the polemics, the role of the elite power struggle in the underdevelopment of Africa remains inexhaustively explored. Given the historical and qualitative nature of the study, much reliance is placed on descriptive research design. Modernization and elite theoretical foundations provide useful insights into the imperative of "transiting" Africa to the modern status of the West. From the plethora of literature and analysis, key among the findings include: first, that colonial administrations focused on self-serving power grabbing activities, to the prejudice of development; second, even the successor-African nationalists retained the statist character of the colonial administration; and third, development was hardly listed in the agenda either by the colonialists or African elite. In conclusion, the discontent and pervasive frustration of the marginalised Africans through the statist oppression of the ruling faction of the elite gave rise to aggravation of the operating centrifugal forces. The end-product was massive resentment and emergence of violent protests, reinforced by military interventions in politics, in post-independence African countries, from the 1960s, as exemplified by the Nigerian situation. The suggested remedy is for African elite to "restructure" their elite political or power appetite.*

**Keywords:** Development, Colonialism, Elite, Power, Nationalists.

### Introduction

Africa's effort at achieving development has been meagrely successful, because her economies have either stagnated or regressed, with real incomes lower than their levels many decades back. Thus, they have become poorer in real terms, with dwindling prospects of affordable health care and decaying infrastructure. Even the political and social institutions have experienced degradations. Instead, insecurity, unemployment and insurgency have progressed exponentially (Ewing, 1968).

Very tritely, numerous factors have been suggested in efforts at providing the insights into the observed and sustained failure of Africa's development project. Critical among the factors are the often recourse to colonialism, the preponderance of certain centrifugal phenomena, leadership failure, pervasive corruption, the plural social nature, weak labour skills and the low numbers of professionals, poor planning, gross managerial incompetence, poor or lack of entrepreneurship, inappropriate public policies, weak institutions, unfavourable market

mechanism, weak terms of trade, unfavourable balance of trade, paltry foreign and technical assistance, poverty and the attendant low capital formation and low savings, among a myriad of problems (Jhingan, 2006; Anyanwu, Oaikhenan, Oyefusi and Dimowo, 1997). Either acting individually or in concert, the factors pose serious obstacles to development.

The notion that the aforestated economic and social problems are central in the lagged or failed development of Africa presupposes that development was part of the grand plan, a position that is contested. Instead, it suffices to assume that development per se may not have been indeed conceived and initiated sincerely *ab initio*, by African states. More realistically, the political climate may be the greater obstacle to development. This study is therefore intended to undertake an expository re-examination of the roles that politics play against the development of Africa.

### **The Problem**

That development has eluded Africa over many decades and generations is not in dispute. Nevertheless, what is unresolved is the location of the key operating factor in the failure: economic, social or political? Since "politics" is the pivot of all social relations and endeavours, the political process or institution is the authoritative allocator of values (Appadorai, 2004). The political process is indeed the central processing unit, the decider and the allocator of all resources. This is why much is devoted to understanding the political economy of a society from the lowest municipal through the sub-national to the highest national level.

Ironically, the political authority is often quick at excusing itself from failures to attain the desired economic and social development by the state. The question which deserves an answer therefore is whether the bureaucracy which provides the mere "administrative tool", or the "economy" which is "inanimate" should truly take responsibility for a function devolved to the political institution in the "social contract" arrangement. Although much has been done to locate the blame appropriately, this study contends that in the polemics, the role of politics in the underdevelopment of Africa *vis-à-vis* the economic and social factors, remains inexhaustively analysed. Flowing from the problem, the key objective of this study is to attempt an expository re-examination of the cardinal role of politics in initiating, institutionalizing, retarding and militating against development in Africa. Other objectives include to conduct a re-examination of the post-independent political environment in Africa and its role in the development paradigm; and to offer antidotes for redressing the observed developmental antigens introduced through politics.

### **Methodology**

Historical literature is replete with the trajectory of Africa's development, from pre-colonial, through colonial, to independence periods. The records and literature provide a useful database from which further analysis progresses. This study employs the content analytical design. Such approach provides useful opportunity to examine and re-examine existing records and positions of earlier efforts, by administrative officers and scholars. The design is also useful when a descriptive examination of a phenomenon is necessary, as it is in this study.

### **Nature of Africa's Colonization**

Without doubt, the experience of the African continent in colonization differed from those of Europe, Asia and the Americas. In Africa, for example, the colonialists decided answers to the key economic problems: what to produce, who should produce, and the method of production. Labour supply, whether voluntary or forced, was at the pleasure of the colonial masters. Administration of the people, including tax imposition, was removed from the traditional institutions. This forceful overthrow of fiscal powers broke off the traditional institutional ties and fragmented the social cohesion, giving vent to the proletarianization of the society. To upskill workers' dexterity, technical education was provided so as to produce the much-desired workforce in road and rail line construction, port facilities maintenance and all associated hard jobs, in order to facilitate the smooth and easy evacuation and export of primary products and import of manufactures. Commodity boards were also established, to facilitate the sale of primary produce to overseas buyers. In effect, the colonialists took over the firm control of the economies of the colonized African "states". The stranglehold on the African state engendered frustration and led to occasional expression of aggression or resentment by the oppressed Africans, as witnessed in Kenya's Mau Mau uprising and the Aba Riots in Nigeria in 1929 (Falola, 1987).

In line with totally deciding what to produce, the "masters" "forced" Africans to deliver produce of their (colonialists) needs. Thus, cocoa which was alien to Ghana before colonization was introduced in 1865, thereby laying a foundation for the "forceful" cropping and exporting of cocoa by Ghana, such that by 1939, cocoa contributed about 80 percent of the value of Ghana's total exports (Ake, 1996). Kenya, well-endowed to produce coffee had to abandon the thriving and profitable occupation following the enactment of the Coffee Plantation Registration Ordinance of 1918, which outlawed the cropping of the commodity by Africans (Ake, 1996). The objective of the draconian legislation was to free Africans for paid labour; and also, to prevent a situation in which African farmers could steal coffee from European farms, by "dislegalising" their possession of coffee. Furthermore, other discriminatory practices aimed at depriving Africans include the clear reservation of the highlands in Kenya for the "white farmers", and an ordinance, the Marketing of Native Produce Ordinance of 1935, which limited wholesale marketing to the "masters", with a total ban on Africans (Fallers, 1956).

Flowing from the foregoing are two glaring unwholesome characteristics of colonial exercise of state power on the African colonies. The characteristics: absolute rule and arbitrary proceedings, shaped the politics of the Europeans in their overlordship on African colonies. To massage the have-no-choice people, the Europeans insisted, in excuses, that the whole episode intended to move the animist and illiterate Africans into civilization. Of course, any iota of opposition to the colonial use of arbitrary power was promptly and forcefully resisted. Ultimately therefore, the motivating force behind colonial rule was the endless acquisition of power necessary to subjugate the colonized people and thereby render their traditional and natural rights impotent and irrelevant.

### **The Political Factors in Post-Colonial Era**

The architecture of state administration or management of the African state naturally altered, upon massive attainment of independence, but the character of the state remained

unchanged. The economy remained statist, while management was totalistic. With a narrow social base relying on coercion instead of legitimacy, the state allowed its use as an instrument of oppression and violence. Hence, independence was not granted on altruistic basis, but in reaction by the colonialists to the ineluctable eventuality to leave. In any case, handover of government powers by the colonialists was to African successors who could accept and play the role of stooges and who would continue to protect and advance their interests. In all therefore, securing political independence was not the success it was orchestrated to be; rather, it was an integration of the African political elites into the society or class of the colonial masters. In the post-colonial period, the dispositions of the dominant social forces were to replicate the past. No serious effort at transforming Africa was on the agenda. Consciously however, the elites were aware that broadening the social base of the state power was out of the question.

In the interim, the situation over time witnessed a multiplication of conflict within the ranks of the emerging nationalist coalition. As the political elite corps was indigenized, class conflict intensified. The situation was exacerbated by the depoliticization of the nationalist movement, in order to check the disenchantments which grew out of the failure to achieve the transformation that many Africans struggled and yearned for. Kwame Nkrumah, like many African leaders: Jomo Kenyatta, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo and Nwafor Orizu, in his speech, "I speak for freedom", exposed his strong desire for a democratic and egalitarian Africa (Coleman, 1958).

The emerging nationalist movement was a coalition of groups united by a common purpose: resentment of the oppressive colonial rule. In character, the movement was a wide network of activists of diverse nationalities, ethnicities, religious organisations, professionals and other syncretistic movements, united to resist colonialism. "United" as it were, the movement was all time challenged by serious tension and internal conflict.

The progress in the likelihood of widening opportunity for political independence brought to the fore the weakening of the solidarity in the coalition. The major challenge was not as serious in mustering the critical mass to overthrow the colonial power as it was in how to "allocate" the wrestled power to either a particular member, or to a group in such way as to dowse the resultant political tension created by the rivalry among the constituent units. Of note was the absence at the time of the requisite institutional and ideological mechanism for subjecting the new power to constitutionalism and accountability. Thus, the quagmire or impasse which the coalition had to resolve was how to wrestle the power from the colonialists on the one hand, and how to checkmate each other from grabbing it on the other. Overtime, the battle shifted from the colonialists to internal struggle for power appropriation, as the colonialist now "relocated" from the position of opposition to one of umpire. Internal strife and competition among the coalition of the elite groups became characteristic of politics and modus operandi of the Africa state.

The centripetal forces had progressively given way to the contending centrifugal forces by the dawn of independence in the early part of the 1960s. In Uganda, the Cameroons, Nigeria, Zaire, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Uganda and Ghana, the disintegrating forces posed a major challenge to independence, besides diminishing the prospects of political viability of the emerging states and governments. In the stampede, many of the newly

independent states, Nigeria inclusive, commenced operations with complex constitutions that facilitated their initial political problems.

The newly independent African states were more concerned in the intense competition with acquiring political power for themselves than with the obvious disintegration initiated by the growing centrifugal forces. The fear of the elites was the aftermath of losing out to the opponent in the struggle to control state power. This premium on power acquisition characterized the post-colonial political arena in the emerging independent African state.

The intensity of the political situation was aggravated by the strong desire to deploy state machinery and power for personal accumulation. Given their very weak material standing due to the marginalization by the discriminatory economic policies of the colonial administration, the need by the elites to strengthen their economic base became pressing. State power was therefore the most viable option to lay the foundation for a strong footing, in the light of the lacking entrepreneurial skills and capital.

Economic statism, achieved via increased government involvement in economic activities through nationalisation, was deployed to gain a firmer control of the wealth base of the newly independent states, in order to place the political elites in a vantage position of resource control and wealth acquisition. All these: statism, monopoly power and interposition of coercion in labour process, drastically increased the desire to capture state power.

With the alienation of the leaders from the people after colonialism, the intensity of politicking gained momentum. The elite adopted coercion in dealing with the expression of the resentment which grew among the people as a result of the attempt by the elite to enforce political conformity. Followers who expressed discontent with the conduct of their political leaders were "beaten" to conformity with the order. Even the plural nature of the social policy was ignored, in preference for coercion, to force political unity in an emerging social system characterized by division, politicization and elite exploitation.

As the situation degenerated, the major factional political elite became isolated and relied more on coercion and engaged in war with rival factions within its ranks and the other part of society. This way, competition for power progressed to warfare and facilitated the enthronement of violence mongers. In the murky situation, the African state became a theatre of military coups, to formalize the disorder that had long existed. Analysts including Ake (1996) thus concluded that:

It was not the military that caused military rule in Africa by intervening in politics; rather, it was the character of politics that engendered military rule by degenerating into warfare, inevitably propelling the specialists of war to the lead role.

For the emphasis, the African state, both in form and function retained most of its colonial character at independence, for many countries. In effect, state power remained as it was, characterized by arbitrariness, violence, threat and enormity. Power was pursued, acquired and sustained by all means and at all cost. Botswana provided the exception where zero-sum game was deemphasized in pursuit of power (Fieldhouse, 1986). The nutshell of the legacy is heightened competition for power, devoid of ideological foundation, and a situation of growing discontent among the people who hoped for a better life and future.

### **Acquired and Cultivated Political Culture Syndrome and Power Interplay**

The political culture which was "received" or "acquired" or "inherited" from the colonialists at independence was unreceptive to development. More than any other thing, the major preoccupation of the elite was struggle for power. Losers in the power game worried about the new risk they assumed, from state oppression that was far from adherence to constitutionality in its *modus operandi*. In reaction, the losers constantly mobilized all forces to repel any oppression that may originate from the state, since they realized their vulnerability to harassment or intimidation. Little did losers bother to refocus on economic aspiration, because such ambition was futile without state patronage. To be sure, economic success or even personal security was at the convenience and mercy of the state. So, for a loser to contemplate a venture into economic activity without the requisite state support was as unreasonable as taking personal security for granted. Well entrenched in the ambit of the ruling elite faction, little was it necessary, therefore, to engage in any economic enterprise because membership of the state and state power readily and effectively provided wealth.

Under the enormous cloud and intrigues generated by state autocracy, the powerful elite was so immersed in the struggle for power survival and retention that they totally forgot development in their agenda. To ignore development, as a potent tool for achieving cohesion and unity of purpose in the disintegrating polity, was tactless. Besides, development was the cardinal means of survival and regeneration of political domination by the elite. An attempt to resolve the development quagmire saw the elite offering semblance of development packages but not without transferring the burden of development to external forces or institutions. The scenario that emerged was a warm embrace of external economic dependence by African leaders, who preached but lamented what they considered as a fragile political independence and the strong imperative of fortifying same via a self-reliant development. To achieve development through external reliance, the vertical relations between Africa and the developed world needed an adjustment and realignment, to guarantee the desired growth-including and propelling quantum of technical aid, additional loans on softer terms, additional direct foreign investment (DFI), more rapid transfer of technology, better terms of trade and more open access to European markets, among a myriad of other factors imperatives.

To achieve the development desire, development plans and budgets of African state had to depend on external financing. This need was indispensable across Africa, even for self-sustaining, conscious and prudent-centric countries like Tanzania and Nigeria. The early post-independence development plans by Tanzania (Ake, 1996) and Nigeria (Anyanwu, 1997) were premised respectively on over 78% and 50% of external financing sources, fuelling dependency as an aftermath of colonialism.

### **Modernization and Development Paradigm**

To hold their people and to retain power, the leaders of the now independent African state needed to replace the self-government ideology of the nationalist. This was the reason for the emergence of the new "development ideology". Although the nationalists knew the need for development, they did not consider the process imperative. Yet all the leaders realized that to progress, there was urgency in overcoming the disintegrating centrifugal forces in the African system, be they economic, political, military or technological. Prominent nationalists: Nnamdi Azikiwe, Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor, Jomo Kenyatta and Amicar Cabral through their

powerful speeches and writings expressed the urgency in the need for Africa to “catch up with the West” and thus become more competitive in the contemporary world order.

Realizing the changing times, the ex-colonialists through their new-found promotion of “partnership in development”, pushed to remain relevant, against the backdrop of the imminent collapse of colonialism; and to rally alliances for the battle against communism. Nationalist leaders, given the favourable international environment, shifted base from independence to the rather more germane ideology of development. Their argument was that concerted efforts were required, “to bake the cake before it could be available for sharing”. This way, hard work gained emphasis and currency. On this basis, most East African leaders adopted a new nationalist slogan of “*Uhuru na kazi* (freedom means hard work), from “Uhuru” (freedom) (Coulson, 1979).

As the case was in Germany, when the “West country” adopted hard work, to move forward after World War II, African leaders preached hard work, devoid of any form of opposition, but absolute obedience of and loyalty to the power, if development was to be achieved. Therefore, it became an offence, a crime at that, to offer resistance to power. This “obedience ploy” laid the foundation for the formation of political systems based on single party. But the subterfuge called “development ideology” was deployed to sustain political hegemony. To be sure, the impetus was negligible and the “ideology” was scarcely efficacious in achieving development. That is not to argue that there were not national development plans; all newly independent countries: Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana, etc, drew up plans, in reaction to the rave of the moment in the advanced world. With changing times, the fads in Europe and elsewhere changed; African leaders followed suit and abandoned the plans.

Because of the contradictions in the development ideology, the so-called ideology became the problem of development. This arose from the conflict between the implicit and explicit purposes. African leaders, though preached development, failed to translate the slogan to manifest programmes of action capable of transforming the polity or society. The failure or dereliction was neither an oversight, nor lack of interest; but it was because African leaders were totally submerged in the politics of survival and power acquisition or retention. African leaders passed the buck to Europe, to provide a development model. Expectedly, the West offered their own prototype social transformation model underpinned by modernization theory.

### **Theoretical Framework**

From the foregoing analysis, and in the light of development as a central question in Africa, this study adopts an admixture of modernization theory and elite theory. Modernization theory (Moore, 1963; Apter, 1963; Hagen, 1962) presupposes the existence of a state of backwardness in a polity. Such underdevelopment may be marked chiefly by low rate of economic growth. The backwardness may, understandably, be amenable to change or remedial action through a process of capital injection. At a stage, underdevelopment was world-wide. Modernization believes that, given that the advanced world was able to overcome the state of underdevelopment, every other country which follows the growth trajectory can arrive at the same “modern destination”. Modernization obeys the Stages of Growth Theory of Rostow (1960) which posits that growth follows well defined stages. Underdeveloped countries which follow the experience of the veteran developed world can achieve the feat. Through appropriate

interaction with developed countries therefore, underdeveloped countries can capitalize on the lessons of the advanced world, for transformation.

Modernization presupposes that Western type experience in social evolution is the ideal type. In essence, the transformation of any part of the underdeveloped world must follow the path of the West, and indeed become "Western" in all orientation and culture. Cultural resistance necessitated that for modernization to endure, "modernization of attitudes" must be first achieved. This limitation narrows the applicability of the theory to specific approaches required to drive the modernization of different underdeveloped countries.

Developed in the 1950s and 1960, modernization theory with the cardinal thesis of the superior development stage of the West, in relation to the lower stages of the rest of the world, is optimistic that the latter will ultimately transit to the Western status, particularly if they steadfastly endured and followed the evolutionary trajectory of the West. In effect, the theory is premised on the Rostow's stages (Ujo, 2008). The relevance of modernization theory to this study is its usefulness in providing the insights into the development trajectory of the underdeveloped world, Africa typical.

As earlier noted, the development paradigm of the African state to a large extent, ignored the historical and specific peculiarities of the constituent countries. In the confused situation, almost all things were so cherished that there was nothing unique on which basis the paradigm could be understood. The situation gave rise to the avalanche of studies and practices in Africa. In the blurred circumstance, theories propounded for purposes other than Africa's development were applied, even when they failed to provide realistic explanations of the situation and experience; and even when they were useless, when applied in comparative analysis.

Colonial and African leaders who struggled to capture power for personal political and economic advancement belong to the political elite class. Theoretically, the elite is a small group of people within a larger group who have more power, social standing, wealth or talent than the rest of the group, as defined by the Encarta Dictionary (2009). Indeed, they are persons with organised capacity to make real political trouble without being promptly repressed (Habu, 2018). They consist of prestigious and well-established leaders, including top politicians, top businessmen, high level civil servants, top military brass, top union leaders and at times less individually known persons. The list is longer but characteristically, the class is restricted to persons who are at the top of the pyramid of political, economic and social power (Padelford, 1976). Against the backdrop of the role of the elite in shaping the political environment and conditions of a state or society, this study also rests on the Elite Theory as a mechanism for understanding the role of elitism in the development paradigm.

Elite theory dates back to the writings of several European thinkers before the growth of Fascism; who expressed various views. More specifically, Italian Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, German Robert Michels, and Spanish Jose Ortega Gasset pioneered the thinking and the theory (Habu, 2018). Post-World War II development of the theory was however undertaken by American Social Scientists, in the 1950s: Schumpeter, Harold Lasswell and Wright C. Mills, who were economist, political scientist and sociologist respectively. As a tool of socio-politico-economic analysis, the theory was popularized by Vilfredo Pareto who, through his work, "Mind and Society", translated in 1935, explored the nature of individual and social behaviour and action. More than any other work then, Pareto's was known for the



It was assumed, albeit erroneously, that African institutions were compatible with the received Western alternatives. But they certainly were not, because of dissimilarities in law, consciousness, language, experience and other distortions which emanated from ethnocentricism, on which studies in development were based. In a nutshell, the scenario posed cumbersome challenges to development in Africa: the new development consciousness in Africa erroneously assumed that modernization was about the same irrespective of the cultural origin, African or Western. But certainly, differences exist, in parochialism, inefficiency, corruption of public officers and the high preponderance of authoritarianism by leaders. These differences could, to Ake (2008), be resolved ultimately by the logic of capitalism.

### **Nigeria in the Picture**

The post-colonial architecture of state management in Nigeria was a microcosm of the situation in larger Africa. The early nationalists: Nnamdi Azikiwe, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Chief Anthony Enahoro, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, Herbert Macaulay and a host of others, initially presented a common front in the struggle to totally wrestle political domination from the colonialists. Through various political structures and activities, political parties, conferences and movements, the nationalists pushed Nigeria's agenda of republicanism. But the dispositions of the dominant social forces replicated the past. Progressively, the situation was exacerbated by the growing multiplicity of conflict within the ranks of the elites, with competition for power as the core of the agenda. The resulting conflict reinforced the centrifugal forces which culminated in the cut-throat power struggle between elites. During the First Republic, intra- and inter-party disharmonies initiated by personal and factional quests for power overthrew and dominated the initial common purpose of total decolonization of Nigeria.

What became paramount was far from anything development, even though development, repeatedly packaged in national development plans: First, Second, Third, etc, was the carrot which the elite dangled before the unsuspecting polity. The various political explosives which rocked Nigeria in the early years of her independence was a culmination of the charged atmosphere created by the selfish power expedition embarked upon by the elite. To the elite, the expedition was irreversible, irrespective of the aftermath. Power became everything. To achieve any level of wealth, power was the major tool: its acquisition and retention gave access to government Treasury, enabled the control of government enterprises, and, indeed fortified the elite against vulnerability to opposition, since economic power is the infrastructure on which political superstructure is erected.

In the aftermath of the self-centred character of the elite politics, the disenchanting body politic reacted to the emergent and growing corruption and marginalisation of the people; and the political opposition in the form of military intervention: initially 1966 and 1967; and progressively as a political culture, in the many decades that followed. Year-in-year-out, budgets are proposed in line with the fad across the underdeveloped continents. While every budget is christened "budget of development", scarcely is development a real vision, objective and mission. Consequently, "modern Nigeria" is characterized by decaying or decayed infrastructure, dead enterprises, illusory energy or power supply, scandalizingly high youth unemployment rate, novel insecurity rate, and indeed, all the features of underdevelopment which early economists: Simon Kuznets, G.M. Meier, W.A. Lewis, W.W. Rostow, Hollis B. Chenery, J.A. Schumpeter, and J. Hicks, among many others, identified and worried about.

### Conclusion

The development needed, in Africa, by Africans, remained a project with considerably low expectation or probability of accomplishment. Upon the exit of colonialism, too much focus was directed at power; and given the absence of any effective institutional mechanisms for putting power competition in check, the situation was akin to war. In the total immersion in power competition, every other aspect of life, including development, suffered severe setback on the African continent, post colonialism. In order to refocus away from the distractions, and to refocus on development, an ideology of development, as a new “movement”, became critical. The political elites who were preoccupied with the struggle to survive, and to maintain their power, in order to retain their domains in the aftermath of colonialism, saw development ideology as an effective strategy of power, which addressed the necessity for development. For the colonialists, the “cold-war” between African elites offered an opportunity for a partnership that would facilitate and maintain their influence in their former colonies, in order to continually promote their interests.

The new “development ideology” represented the interests of the African political elites and their ex-colonialists, besides doubling as an “agenda for economic transformation”. Without doubt, the economic function was secondary to the elites. Because, the transformation ideology was crafted to serve the interests of the initiators, it was shrouded in ambiguity. So, the ideology of development was a façade behind which the ruling elite appropriated and justified power.

Upon the eventual crafting of the ideology however, African leaders abandoned its implementation to the international community on whom the responsibility for funding the development plans was placed. In Nigeria and Tanzania for example, dependence was over 78 and 50 percent respectively of their initial development plans on external resources. This way, the whole idea of development became an abstraction. Worse still, the new development agenda was ahistorical, as it was careless about the specifics of the diverse countries. Thus, it disregarded any links with the country-specific cultures, institutions, social and political backgrounds. This cultureless posture of the ideology paved the way for the colonialists, who were still hanging by the corridors, to swiftly infiltrate with their own experience and solutions. Eventually therefore, the development ideology faced some limitations in its utility as a mechanism for the transformation and economic development of the African state.

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